our ignorance. Thus we are entertained and even amused by the tongue-in-cheek interpretations of 1988 by leading salon commentators (Erikson 1989; Sigelman 1989 Sigelman , 1990 . ' But we are still left with the uncomfortable feeling that, as a profession, we know much less than we think. So when we are challenged by yet another paradigm, one which contends that presidential campaigns are media horse races run on video and audio sound tracks, and by implication, that American voters are rootless consumers of political "sound bites," it is time to take intellectual stock (Joslyn 1984; Orren and Polsby 1980) . My position in this debate is as follows. While I agree that the media is playing a much greater role in presidential elections, I feel that its impact has been greatly exaggerated by journalistic hype. True, the electoral environment today is far different than it was 40 years ago at the dawn of television. Americans are generally more urbanized, educated, mobile, affluent, individualistic, and politically sophisticated. Consequently, they are also more independent than ever before-about one-third consider themselves independentand therefore more receptive to the campaign appeals of individual candidates. But the medium only communicates the message. It is not the message itself.
In order to understand the growing role of the media and the changing character of presidential campaign politics, it is my thesis that political scientists must first understand the cultural realities of American politics and the kinds of issues that concern most voters. Thus I will argue that modern presidential elections are being increasingly decided, not by the socioeconomic issues traditionally emphasized by liberal Democrats, but by a new set of cultural issues, first identified by Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg in The Real Majority. It is my contention that Bush won in 1988 because he was more successful in appealing to the cultural preferences (issues) and stereotypes (images) of those groups who constitute the real, cultural majority in American politics.
My case rests on the following contentions:
(1) That the United States is a diverse, multicultural society composed of competing racial, ethnic, religious, and regional subcultures. This is a political axiom that many liberal Democrats seem to accept in theory but reject in practice. On the one hand, America's cultural pluralism is not denied. But on the other, it is often claimed that the nation's racial, ethnic, religious, and regional divisions are not that important now, are waning over time, and will ultimately become insignificant (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1989 ). Yet, there is a growing mass of evidence which suggests that ethnocultural differences in American society are still persistent and consequential. And rather than decreasing, they may actually be on the rise. This evidence includes recent census data on the racial and ethnic identifications of Americans, survey data on church membership, subcultural studies of American government and politics, and cultural explanations of American political behavior.
As Leege, Lieske, and Wald (1989: 31) have observed, "Racial and ethnic diversity-and the group consciousness that accompanies themhave accelerated rapidly in recent years."2 In 1960, they point out, the United States was 88.6% white, 10.5% black, and less than 1%o Asian and other. By 1985, they note, the predominant group, white Anglos, had dropped in population share by 10%0 while blacks increased to 12%. Though they are declining as a proportion of the population, the two dominant ethnic groups in American politics are those who claim British (22.4%) and German (22.3%) ancestry. Along with Americans of Scandinavian (1.1 ) ancestry, these so-called "mainline" groups constitute a cultural plurality, if not political majority, in American politics. 3 Historically, these groups were among the "first effective settlers" in most states and regions of the country (Gastil 1975 ). In addition, they share a common Germanic tongue and cultural tradition in the family of Indo-European languages. And they also share common religious traditions in the Protestant wing of Christianity.
Moreover, contrary to the secular claims of some sociologists and futurists, religion and religious diversity continue to play a vital role in the life of the nation. Relative to other advanced industrial democracies, the United States stands out in the high proportion (58 percent versus middle teens to middle thirties for other countries) of its citizens who say that religion is still "very important" to them (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988 (Elazar 1970; Gastil 1975; Garreau 1981) .
Finally, historical studies of the American electorate suggest that partisan divisions and voting behavior are best understood in terms of the political preferences of subcultural groups operating within different regions and locales (Kleppner 1970; Kelley 1979) . And rather than disappearing, subcultural differences are still crucial in understanding current party loyalties and voting in recent presidential elections (Lieske 1988a (Lieske , 1988b . Moreover, their effects appear to be independent of socioeconomic differences and regionally specific. Using aggregate data for all 3,164 U.S. counties and a rigorous test for compositional effects, I have shown that there are significant subcultural differences in the 1980 U.S. presidential vote, and that the factors which shape the vote differ from one region of the country to the next (Lieske 1989 In the voting literature, policy disputes are generally viewed as "hard" political issues (Carmines and Stimpson 1980) . From a cultural perspective, they are primarily concerned not with how Americans feel toward the objects (i.e., beneficiaries) of government action (the so-called "easy" issues) but how they feel toward the less completely understood instruments (i.e., programs) for carrying them out. Unfortunately, this useful distinction has been largely lost by the equivalent but more antiseptic social-psychological distinction between "symbolic" and "cognitive" issues (Conover and Feldman 1981 (4) That the Bush campaign was brilliantly conceived and superbly executed to exploit the racial-ethnic, religious, and cultural divisions in American society.
The strategy employed three classic cultural appeals: (a) reference group identifications, (b) religious beliefs, and (c) cultural dominance. These appeals were designed to remind "mainline" northern whites, evangelical southern whites, northern white ethnics, and conservatives that Republicans are the party of white dominance, religious morality, cultural orthodoxy, and social order. This strategy was made possible by proclaiming the successes of the Reagan-Bush economic recovery (the 25 percent tax cut, the 50 percent reduction in inflation, the cutting of interest rates from 21 to 10 percent, and the creation of 17 million new jobs) and the defense buildup, thereby neutralizing if not appropriating the prosperity and peace issues.
The cultural appeals employed subtle codewords and visual images Table 3 Nationally, as well as regionally, it is possible to see the potency of the conservative and liberal labels in the 1988 presidential election. As noted above, Bush worked assiduously to pin the liberal label on Dukakis, and based on the tabulated results, the strategy appears to have worked. Another strategy that bore fruit for the Republican candidate was his "negative" campaign. Thus, his vote seems to have been shaped more by voter attitudes toward "negative" than toward "positive" reference groups. These negative reference groups include welfare recipients, illegal aliens, gays and lesbians, blacks, feminists, labor unions, and civil rights leaders. All, of course, can be lumped under the liberal label.
The results of Tables 1 and 3 that if political reference groups are interpreted as the cultural "objects" of public policy, then at the national level cultural (symbolic) issues were at least as important as the so-called rational (cognitive) issues in structuring the presidential vote. At the disaggregated regional level, of course, cultural reference group theory appears to provide a superior predictive model to rational voting theory.
To estimate the impact of the cultural dominance issue in the 1988 campaign, it is necessary to make the following assumptions. According to cultural theory, racial origin and ethnic ancestry are the fountainheads of subcultural differences. Given this premise, it follows that in culturally pluralistic societies, electoral politics is, among other things, the struggle for racial and ethnic dominance. If this thesis is true, then there should be a strong correlation between a ranking of the culturally dominant and subordinate groups in American society, on the one hand, and the presidential vote on the other. -middle ($12,500-$24,999), middle ($25,000-$34,999 Perhaps a more definitive test of this contention, however, is provided by individual level data drawn from the 1988 NES study. Table 5 presents the results of correlating the 1988 Bush vote with five selected variables for the entire national sample and eight regional subsamples. The variables include measures of racial origin, ethnic ancestry, Protestant church membership, family income, and Republican party identification. From a cultural perspective, the party identification variable may be construed as a supra-cultural variable that reflects individual differences in racial-ethnic background, religious affiliation, social structure, and regional subculture. And since it is so close to the actual vote decision, it appears to represent an overall propensity to vote for the endorsed candidate of one party over the other.
Therefore, if we set aside (ignore) the results for party identification, the tabulated data clearly show that the 1988 presidential vote was structured more in each region (and nationally) by cultural (i.e., racial, ethnic, or religious) than socioeconomic (i.e., family income) differences. In addition, it is clear that the distribution of the vote depends on the cultural mix in each region. Thus, race becomes an important cleavage in the vote wherever blacks are found in significant numbers, namely the Mid-Atlantic, Great Erikson (1989: 30) , for instance, has mischievously argued that "it must be in the Democrats' electoral interest to lose presidential elections." In his first retrospective assessment, Lee Sigelman (1989: 38) waggishly attributes the outcome of the presidential primaries to momentum and "the constantly shifting and largely unforeseeable fortunes of the campaign"; in his second, he (Sigelman 1990 ) sardonically concludes that "Democrats are too stupid to calculate their self-interest" and Democratic presidential candidates are too ugly to win.
2. Perhaps one unobtrusive measure of this trend is the large number of parents in the 1980s (Williams 1990 : 17) who chose names for their children "that reflected their heritage, ethnic origin and economic status." 3. Based on the 1988 National Election Study, about 71 percent of all self-identified "mainline" respondents reported voting as opposed to 64 percent of all self-identified "white ethnic" respondents, 55 percent of all self-identified "Asian-American" respondents, 46 percent of all self-identified "New World" respondents, 52 percent of all selfidentified "African-American" respondents, and 49 percent of all self-identified "American" respondents. For definitional purposes, "mainline" respondents include those who 
